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We examine the task of privacy amplification from information-theoretic and coding-theoretic points of
view. In the former, we give a one-shot characterization of the optimal rate of privacy amplification against
classical adversaries in terms of the optimal type-II error in asymmetric hypothesis testing. This formulation
can be easily computed to give finite-blocklength bounds and turns out to be equivalent to smooth min-
entropy bounds by Renner and Wolf [Asiacrypt 2005] and Watanabe and Hayashi [ISIT 2013], as well as a
bound in terms of the Eγ divergence by Yang, Schaefer, and Poor [arXiv:1706.03866 [cs.IT]]. In the latter,
we show that protocols for privacy amplification based on linear codes can be easily repurposed for channel
simulation. Combined with known relations between channel simulation and lossy source coding, this im-
plies that privacy amplification can be understood as a basic primitive for both channel simulation and lossy
compression. Applied to symmetric channels or lossy compression settings, our construction leads to proto-
cols of optimal rate in the asymptotic i.i.d. limit. Finally, appealing to the notion of channel duality recently
detailed by us in [IEEE Trans. Info. Theory 64, 577 (2018)], we show that linear error-correcting codes for
symmetric channels with quantum output can be transformed into linear lossy source coding schemes for
classical variables arising from the dual channel. This explains a “curious duality” in these problems for
the (self-dual) erasure channel observed by Martinian and Yedidia [Allerton 2003; arXiv:cs/0408008] and
partly anticipates recent results on optimal lossy compression by polar and low-density generator matrix
codes.
1 Introduction
Packing and covering are at the core of most simple information processing primitives. In noisy channel
coding, for instance, where inputs lead to probability distributions over output symbols, one would like to
pack as many of these distributions into the space of all possible output distributions such that no two of them
overlap significantly. This gives an error-correcting code, as the associated inputs can be reliably inferred from
the channel output. Covering is in some sense dual to packing, as the goal is to find a set of distributions
whose empirical average approximates (“covers”) a target distribution. In channel simulation, for instance,
we would like to approximate the channel output for a given input with the minimal possible amount of
additional randomness.
In this paper we examine the simple covering task of privacy amplification, also known as randomness
extraction, both from an information-theoretic as well as a coding-theoretic point of view. The goal of privacy
amplification, originally introduced in [1], is to deterministically transform a given random variable Y , which
may be correlated with Z , into the largest possible new random variable V which is uniformly-distributed and
independent of Z . Regarding Z as information held by an adversary or eavesdropper Eve and Y as the variable
each held by Alice and Bob, privacy amplification can be understood as a means of extracting a random secret
key from information partially correlated with the adversary.
The natural information-theoretic question is how much randomness can be extracted, and the answer
depends on the setting. In cryptography, one is interested in making as few assumptions on the correlations
to the eavesdropper as possible and usually considers constraints formulated in terms of the min-entropy the
adversary has about Y , which is related to the maximal probability of guessing Y [2, 3]. One can also consider
adversaries holding quantum information, as opposed to classical, information, but this will not be our focus.
Instead, we will consider the setting where the complete distribution PY Z is known and Z is classical. In
§3 we give upper and lower bounds on the optimal rate of privacy amplification in a one-shot setting that are
formulated in terms of asymmetric hypothesis testing. In particular, the minimal type-II error of discriminating
between the actual distribution PY Z and an uncorrelated distribution RY×QZ plays an important role (see
Theorem 1), where RY is the uniform distribution and QZ is arbitrary. Previous work in [1, 4–8] is based the
smooth min-entropy and its relaxations, though see also [9] and the very recent [10]. Our converse bound
is reminiscient of the metaconverse in channel coding [11, 12][13, Lemma 4.7] not only in appearance, but
also because it leads to tight, computationally-tractable bounds at finite blocklengths. The converse turns
out to be equivalent to both the smooth min-entropy bound of Renner and Wolf, Theorem 1 of [5], and to
the recently formulated Eγ bound of Yang, Schaefer, and Poor, Lemma 5 of [10]. Moreover, whenever the
converse is nontrivial in that the bound on the optimal key size is smaller than the size of the input alphabet,
then the converse is also equivalent to the smooth min-entropy bound of Watanabe and Hayashi, Theorem
1 of [7]. Thus, ultimately we do not need to relax the smooth min-entropy bounds to obtain good finite
blocklength bounds.
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Turning to coding theory, in §4 we show that privacy amplification can be used as a primitive to construct
protocols for channel simulation and lossy compression. First we show that privacy amplification based on
linear functions can be used for simulating the action of a given channel W : X → Y on a given input X , such
that the simulation error in the latter is precisely equal to to the security parameter in the former. The idea
behind the construction, stated in detail in Proposition 4, is to consider privacy amplification of the channel
output Y relative to the input X . If we extend the function from Y to V to be reversible, say g : Y → (T, V ),
then only T needs to be transmitted from the encoder to the decoder in order to reconstruct Y by applying
g−1 to T and common randomness V . By considering linear functions, we can immediately infer the size
of T to be |Y |/|V |. For symmetric channels, this is sufficient to achieve the optimal rate of communication
required for the simulation task, provided the amount of common randomness available to the encoder and
decoder is large enough.
As shown in [14, 15], simulating the optimal channel in the rate-distortion function gives a means of
turning channel simulation into lossy compression. Hence, privacy amplification can also be used to perform
lossy compression, the precise details of which are stated in Corollary 1. For sources and distortion functions
symmetric in a certain sense, such as the canonical example of compressing a uniformly-random input and
considering Hamming distortion, our construction achieves the rate-distortion bound.
Finally, §5 shows that lossy compression can be accomplished by repurposing a good error-correcting
code for an appropriate “dual channel” as recently investigated by us in [16]. In particular, suppose that X
is a random variable to be compressed and reconstructed as X ′ according to a given distortion measure, and
W = PX |X ′ is the optimal channel in the associated rate-distortion function. Then we show that if a code C
is good for the dual channel W⊥, then there exists a similarly good lossy compression scheme for X , where
the reconstructed X ′ are based on codewords of C⊥ (see Corollary 2 for precise details). While it happens
that the encoder of the channel code and the decompressor are related, the lossy encoder is unrelated to the
channel decoder. Hence, no guarantees can be made on the efficiency of the lossy compressor even if efficient
channel decoding is known to be possible.
The dual channel usually has a quantum output, but one important exception is the erasure channel.
In this case, for a channel with erasure probability q, the associated lossy compression problem is precisely
the binary erasure quantization considered by Martinian and Yedidia [17], who established that in this case
channel codes can be converted to lossy source codes and vice versa. Thus, we can understand the forward
implication as resulting from the deeper structure of duality of codes and channels. Establishing this more
general relation precisely is one of the main goals of this paper.
2 Mathematical setup
We shall only consider random variables with a finite alphabet and will treat their associated probability
distributions (probability mass functions) as vectors. For a random variable X with alphabet X , we denote
the probability mass function as PX and consider it to be an element of R|X |. Joint distributions are labelled by
all the relevant random variables, and R denotes the uniform distribution. Product distributions are denoted
by ×, e.g. P×Q, which corresponds to the tensor product at the level of the vector representation.
Events and observables can also be treated as elements of R|X |, and in particular the set of tests will be
important for our purposes. These are simply vectors whose entries lie in the interval [0, 1]. For a test Λ and
probability PX , the probability of the test itself will be denoted 〈Λ, PX 〉, which denotes the Euclidean inner
product.
We shall also have occasion to consider quantum states and tests, and this notation can also be employed
in the quantum setting. Probability distributions P are replaced by density operators ρ, positive operators of
unit trace on C|X |, tests by positive operators on the same space whose eigenvalues do not exceed unity, and
the inner product by the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product 〈Λ,ρ〉= Tr[Λρ].
The variational distance of two distributions P and Q is defined by δ(P,Q) := max0≤Λ≤1〈Λ, P −Q〉, where
1 denotes the vector of all ones. From this definition it is immediate that δ(P,Q) satisfies the triangle and
data processing inequalities, and it is easy to show that δ(P,Q) = 12‖P −Q‖1.
Given two distributions, the set of all pairs of probabilities achievable by all possible tests forms the testing
regionR(P,Q) in the unit square. We shall make use of the lower boundary of this region, given by the function
βα(P,Q) := min
Λ
{〈Λ,Q〉 : 〈Λ, P〉 ≥ α, 0≤ Λ≤ 1} . (1)
This can be interpreted as the minimal type-II error in an asymmetric hypothesis test between P and Q, when
the type-I error is constrained to be smaller than 1−α. From the definition it is immediate that βα satisfies the
data processing inequality. That is, for any stochastic map (channel) W , βα(P,Q) ≤ βα(W (P), W (Q)), since
the optimal test Λ? for βα(W (P), W (Q)) induces a feasible test Λ′ for βα(P,Q) by 〈Λ′, P〉= 〈Λ?, W (P)〉.
2
The optimization in 1 is a linear program (see, e.g. [18]), whose dual formulation is
βα(P,Q) = max
µ,S
{µα− 〈1, S〉 : µP − S ≤Q,µ≥ 0, S ≥ 0} . (2)
Complementary slackness conditions for the primal and dual programs lead to the well-known Neyman-
Pearson lemma [19] that the optimal test Λ satisfies Λ(x) = 1 for µP(x)>Q(x), Λ(x) = 0 for µP(x)<Q(x),
and the values of Λ(x) for x with µP(x) = Q(x) are chosen so that the type-I error is 1 − α. Here µ, the
optimal value in the dual, is the cutoff (inverse) likelihood ratio for deciding between P and Q; clearly the
optimal S is just S(x) = max{µP(x) − Q(x), 0}. Thus, the region R(P,Q) is the convex hull of the points
(αk,βαk) obtained by tests of the form Λ(x) = 1 for x such that P(x) ≥ γQ(x) for some γ ≥ 0, and zero
otherwise.
The quantity βα(P,Q) is equivalent to the divergence Eγ(P,Q) := P[
P(x)
Q(x) ≥ γ]− γQ[ P(x)Q(x) ≥ γ] in that
Eγ(P,Q) = α(γ)− γβα(γ)(P,Q) , (3)
where α(γ) = P[ P(x)Q(x) ≥ γ] [20, Theorem 21]. To see this, note that (1) implies βα(γ)(P,Q)≤Q[ P(x)Q(x) ≥ γ], and
therefore Eγ is upper-bounded by the righthand side of (3). On the other hand, with µ= 1/γ in (2), it follows
that γβα(γ) ≥ α(γ)−∑x:P(x)≥γQ(x) P(x)− γQ(x) = α(γ)− Eγ(P,Q). Rerunning the argument but leaving the
optimization over S in the dual implies that Eγ(P,Q) = maxΛ〈Λ, P〉−γ〈Λ,Q〉. In this context we also mention
the bound
βα(P,Q)≤ α
γ
, (4)
which holds for γ such that P[ P(x)Q(x) ≥ γ]≥ α (cf. [20, Equation 2.68]). To derive it, note thatΛ= 1[ P(x)Q(x) ≥ γ] is
feasible for βα(P,Q) by assumption, and therefore βα(P,Q)≤ 〈Λ,Q〉=∑x:Q(x)≤P(x)/γQ(x)≤ 1γ∑x:Q(x)≤P(x)/γ P(x) =
α/γ.
It is not difficult to see that the variational distance of P and Q is the length of the longest vertical line seg-
ment one can place inside above (or below) the diagonal inside the testing region. The following proposition
gives bounds on βα(P,Q) just in terms of α and δ(P,Q).
Lemma 1. For any distributions P and Q and α ∈ [0,1],
α−δ(P,Q)≤ βα(P,Q)≤ α (1− (1−α)δ(P,Q)) . (5)
Proof. Supposing Λ is the optimal test in βα(P,Q), it follows immediately that δ(P,Q) ≥ 〈Λ, P − Q〉 = α −
βα(P,Q). For the upper bound, let Γ be the optimal test in δ(P,Q) and set α? = 〈Γ , P〉. By this definition we
have δ(P,Q) = 〈Γ , P −Q〉. Next, set Λ= a1+ bΓ for a and b to be determined later, but such that 〈Λ, P〉= α,
i.e. a+ bα? = α. It then follows that βα(P,Q)≤ 〈Λ,Q〉= α− bδ(P,Q). Now there are two cases to consider, α
smaller or larger than α?. For the former, the choice a = 0 and b = α?/α ensures that Λ is a valid test. Then
βα(P,Q)≤ α(1− 1α?δ(P,Q)), which implies the desired bound since 1/α? ≥ 1≥ 1−α. For the latter, choosing
b = 1− a and a = (α− α?)/(1− α?) again leads to a valid test. Here we have βα(P,Q) ≤ α(1− 1−α1−α?δ(P,Q))
which implies the desired bound since 11−α? ≥ 1≥ α.
Note that α? = P[P(x) ≥ Q(x)] appearing in the proof is precisely the value of α for which the vertical
distance between the diagonal and the lower boundary of R(P,Q) is the variational distance.
The lower bound corresponds to the upper bound in [21, Proposition 3.2], while the upper bound is due
to Frédéric Dupuis. We mention in passing that the lower bound claimed in Proposition 3.2 is in error. In
particular, for P and Q deterministic and completely uniform distributions of a binary-valued random variable,
respectively, we have δ(P,Q) = 12 and βα(P,Q) =
α
2 . This violates the ostensible bound for α < 1/2. This
example also shows the claimed Pinsker-like inequality 1−αα δ(P,Q)≤ − log 1αβα(P,Q) is violated for α < 1/3.
For a joint distribution PY Z , the min-entropy of Y conditioned on Z is related to the largest conditional
probability PY |Z=z(y), maximized over possible values of Z:1
Hmin(Y |Z)P := − log max
y∈Y,z∈supp(PZ )
PY |Z=z(y) . (6)
1Note that another oft-used definition of the min-entropy is based on averaging over PZ .
3
Following [7], its smoothed version is based on replacing the joint distribution, but not the marginal PZ , with
a nearby distribution QY Z that decreases the ratio:
2
H"min(Y |Z)P := − log minQ:δ(P,Q)≤" maxy∈Y,z∈supp(PZ )
QY Z(y, z)
PZ(z)
. (7)
Using the dual form of δ(P,Q) as min{〈1, T 〉 : T ≥ P−Q, T ≥ 0}, the smoothed min-entropy can be expressed
as a linear program:
2−H"min(Y |Z)P := min{λ : λ1Y PZ ≥QY Z , TY Z ≥ PY Z −QY Z , 〈1Y Z , TY Z〉 ≤ ", 〈1Y Z ,QY Z〉= 1;λ, T,Q ≥ 0} . (8)
3 Bounds on extractable randomness
Given a joint distribution PY Z , the task of randomness extraction, or privacy amplification, of Y relative to
Z is to apply a function f : Y → V such that the resulting distribution PV Z is essentially the same as RV×PZ .
This setup is depicted in Figure 1. We sometimes refer to f as the extractor or extractor function, though note
that in the cryptography community an extractor refers to a set of functions useful for generating randomness
from a source characterized only in terms of min-entropy. We measure closeness by the variational distance,
and say that f is a protocol for (k,") privacy amplification for PY Z when δ(PV Z , RV×PZ) = " and log |V |= k.
PY Z f RV
≈"
PZ
Y V
Z Z
V
Figure 1: Schematic representation of privacy amplification (randomness extraction) of Y relative to
Z . The function f should produce a random variable V which is "-close to being uniformly random
and independent of Z , as measured by the variational distance.
Letting K"(Y |Z)P be the largest K ∈ N such that there exists a (log K ,") privacy amplification protocol for
PY Z , we can show the following result.
Theorem 1. For any joint distribution PY Z ,
K"(Y |Z)P ≤ min
η∈[0,1−"]
1
ηβ"+η(PY Z ,1Y×PZ) and (9)
K"(Y |Z)P ≥ max
η∈[0,"]

4η2
"−η maxQZ
β"−η(PY Z ,1Y×QZ)

. (10)
We will show the second inequality, the achievability statement, by employing two-universal hashing [22].
Thus, linear functions are capable of achieving the stated bounds. The argument is a combination of the argu-
ment given for channel resolvability by Hayashi for channels with classical [23, Lemma 2] and quantum [13,
Lemma 9.2] output with that of the leftover hashing lemma of [24], adapted to yield a bound involving βα.
The first inequality, the converse, is an adaptation of the converse involving min-entropy reported in [25,
§III.A], itself based on [26, §8.2.2]. Both the underlying achievability and converse arguments also apply
when the adversary holds quantum information (i.e. Z is quantum), but this is decidedly not the case for the
hypothesis testing versions. We shall remark on the steps that fail for quantum side information.
3.1 Proof of the converse
Let us begin by showing the converse. It relies on the following lemma, the hypothesis-testing version of the
statement that min-entropy of Y conditioned on Z cannot increase by the application of a function to Y .
Lemma 2. For any function f : Y → V , βα(PV Z ,1V×PZ)≤ βα(PY Z ,1Y×PZ) for all α ∈ [0,1].
Proof. Using the conditional distributions PY |Z=z we can construct a stochastic map W from PV Z back to PY Z :
W (y, z|v, z′) = δz,z′ δ f (y),v PY |Z=z(y)∑
y ′ δ f (y ′),v PY |Z=z(y ′)
. (11)
2Note that the smoothing in [5] is different: QY Z is required to be smaller than PY Z but have a normalization not less than 1− ".
4
Clearly W is stochastic and W (PV Z) = PY Z . By the data processing inequality we have βα(PV Z ,1V×PZ) ≤
βα(PY Z , W (1V×PZ)). Now observe that
[W (1V×PZ)](y, z) =
∑
v,z′
W (y, z|v, z′)PZ(z′) (12a)
= PZ(z)
PY |Z=z(y)∑
y ′ δ f (y), f (y ′)PY |Z=z(y ′)
(12b)
≤ PZ(z) . (12c)
Hence βα(PY Z , W (1V×PZ))≤ βα(PY Z ,1Y×PZ), completing the proof.
Now suppose f : Y → V is the extractor function of a (log K"(Y |Z)P ,") privacy amplification protocol. By
Lemma 1, we have β"+η(PV Z , RV×PZ) ≥ η for any 0 ≤ η ≤ 1− ". This is equivalent to β"+η(PV Z ,1V×PZ) ≥
η|V |= ηK"(Y |Z)P , whence Lemma 2 and a minimization over η gives (9).
Lemma 2 does not hold for quantum Z , as one can find counterexamples. That this might be the case
can be anticipated by noticing that in the proof we make use of the distribution of Y conditioned on the
value of Z , for which there is no quantum analog. To state a specific counterexample, consider the qubit
density operators ϕ j = | j〉〈 j| for j = 0,1 and {| j〉} an orthonormal basis, along with ϕ2 = |+〉〈+|, where
|+〉 = 1p
2
(|0〉 + |1〉). Suppose Y is uniformly-distributed in {0, 1,2} and take the state of Z given Y = y to
be ϕy ; the marginal state of Z averaged over Y is ϕ¯ =
1
3 (1 + |+〉〈+|) For the function f mapping 0 and 1
to 1 and 2 to itself, then V has distribution (2/3, 1/3) and corresponding conditional states 121 and ϕ2. In the
lower bound of βα(ρV Z ,1V×ρZ) we can choose µ= 2 and S = 13 |−〉〈−| so that βα(ρV Z ,1V×ρZ)≥ 2α− 13 . In
the upper bound of βα(ρY Z ,1Y×ρZ) we can take the test for Y = y to be a scaled projection onto the zero
eigenspace of 49ϕy − ϕ¯ for Y = 0,1 and zero for Y = 2. In particular, Λ0 = α6
 
9 −3−3 1

and Λ1 =
α
6
 
1 −3−3 9

,
and Λ3 = 0. Then 〈Λ,ρY Z〉 = α and 〈Λ,1Y ⊗ρZ〉 = 43α, meaning βα(ρY Z ,1Y×ρZ) ≤ 43α. For α > 1/2 this is
smaller than 2α− 13 , so this example shows that the lemma cannot hold for arbitrary α. It is an open question
if it holds for α < 1/2.
The example also shows that the converse bound itself does not hold for quantum Z . The function f
results in an output quantum state ρV Z with " = 1/6, meaning K1/6(Y |Z)ρ ≥ 2. But if we choose η = 1/2 so
that α= " +η= 2/3, then from the converse we have K1/6(Y |Z)ρ ≤ 1η 43α= 169 , a contradiction.
3.2 Proof of achievability
Now we move to the proof of the direct part. Let f : Y → V be an arbitrary function with |V |= K"(Y |Z)P , and
set ∆ := δ(PV Z , RV × PZ). For arbitrary test ΛY Z on Y Z , define the rescaled probability distributions PˆV Z and
P¯V Z such that PˆV Z + P¯V Z = PV Z and PˆV Z(v, z) =
∑
y: f (y)=v PY Z(y, z)ΛY Z(y, z). Using the triangle inequality we
have
∆≤ δ(PV Z , RV×P¯Z) +δ(RV×P¯Z , RV×PZ) (13a)
= δ(PˆV Z + P¯V Z , RV×P¯Z) +δ(P¯Z , PZ) (13b)
≤ δ(P¯V Z , RV×P¯Z) +δ(P¯Z , PZ) + 12‖PˆV Z‖1 (13c)
Due to the form of P¯V Z and PˆV Z , the latter two terms combine to give 〈ΛY Z , PY Z〉, so that
∆≤ 12‖P¯V Z − RV×P¯Z‖1 + 〈ΛY Z , PY Z〉 . (14)
To bound the first term in this expression, we use the fact that (
∑
i |x i |)2 ≤
∑
i s
−1
i x
2
i for any set of si > 0
such that
∑
i si = 1. This follows by writing ‖x‖1 = ‖ xpsps‖1 and applying the Hölder inequality with p =
q = 2. Choosing svz = QZ(z)/|V | for some normalized distribution QZ with strictly positive probabilities to be
determined later, we have
‖P¯V Z − RV×P¯Z‖21 ≤ |V |
∑
vz
QZ(z)
−1(P¯V Z(v, z)− 1|V | P¯Z(z))2 (15a)
= |V |∑
vz
QZ(z)
−1 P¯V Z(v, z)2 −
∑
z
QZ(z)
−1 P¯Z(z)2 . (15b)
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Now let us deal with the summation over v in the first term. With Λ′(y, z) = 1−Λ(y, z) and omitting the Y Z
random variable subscripts, we have∑
v
P¯V Z(v, z)
2 =
∑
v
 ∑
y: f (y)=v
P(y, z)Λ′(y, z)
 ∑
y ′: f (y ′)=v
P(y, z)Λ′(y, z)

(16a)
=
∑
y
P(y, z)2Λ′(y, z)2 +
∑
y 6=y ′
δ f (y)= f (y ′)P(y, z)P(y
′, z)Λ′(y, z)Λ′(y ′, z) . (16b)
Taking the expectation over f chosen uniformly at random from a family of two-universal hash functions, we
then obtain
E f
∑
v
P¯V Z(v, z)
2 =
∑
y
P(y, z)2Λ′(y, z)2 + 1|V |
∑
y 6=y ′
P(y, z)P(y ′, z)Λ′(y, z)Λ′(y ′, z) (17a)
≤∑
y
P(y, z)2Λ′(y, z)2 + 1|V | P¯Z(z)2 . (17b)
Using this in (15) gives
E f ‖P¯V Z − RZ×P¯Z‖21 ≤ |V |
∑
yz
QZ(z)
−1PY Z(y, z)2Λ′Y Z(y, z)2 . (18)
Finally, let ΛY Z be the optimal test in βη(PY Z ,1Y ×QZ), so that 〈ΛY Z , PY Z〉 = η and βη(PY Z ,1Y ×QZ) ≤
µη for the optimal µ in the dual formulation (2). By the properties of the optimal test it follows that
Λ′Y Z(y, z)(µPY Z(y, z)−QZ(z)) ≤ 0. Therefore, Λ′Y Z(y, z)PY Z(y, z)QZ(z)−1 ≤ 1µΛ′Y Z(y, z). From (18) we then
obtain
E f ‖P¯V Z − RV×P¯Z‖21 ≤ |V |µ
∑
yz
PY Z(y, z)Λ
′
Y Z(y, z)
2 (19a)
≤ |V |
µ
(19b)
≤ η|V |
βη(PX Y ,1X ×QY ) . (19c)
By Jensen’s inequality, E f ‖P¯V Z − RV×P¯Z‖21 ≥ (E f ‖P¯V Z − RV×P¯Z‖1)2. Returning to (14), we have
E f∆≤ η+ 12
√√√ η|V |
βη(PY Z ,1Y ×QZ) . (20)
Choosing η= "−δ and |V |= b 4δ2"−δ maxQZ β"−δ(PY Z ,1Y ×QZ)c ensures there exists an f such that∆≤ ". Since
βα(P,Q) is continuous in Q, we may maximize over all QZ , not just those with strictly positive probability. This
completes the proof.
Were Z quantum rather than classical, the test ΛY Z would take the form of a set of positive operators Λy ,
and we would immediately be confronted with the possibility that Λy may not commute with the conditional
quantum states of Z given Y = y , i.e. the quantum versions of PZ |Y=y . In the proof we assume these objects
commute, e.g. in (16). One method of dealing with this issue, as done in [13], is to “pinch” the quantum
states (remove the off-diagonal elements) to restore commutation, and appeal to bounds between the pinched
and unpinched states. It is unclear if this can be done in combination with the steps taken here to end up
with a bound in terms of βα.
3.3 Comparison of the bounds
After publication of the initial version of this manuscript, Wei Yang pointed out that the bounds contained
herein are related to those recently derived in [10]. The achievability bound can be derived from [10, Lemma
2], which states that there exists an (K ,") privacy amplification scheme such that, for all distributions QZ and
γ > 0,
" ≤ Eγ(PY Z , RY×QZ) +
√√ γK
4|Y |EPY Z [exp(−|i(Y :Z)− logγ|)] , (21)
6
where i(y, z) = log PY Z(y, z) − log RY (y)QZ(z). To get back to (10), observe that the expectation term is
necessarily smaller than 1 and Eγ ≤ PY Z[ PY Z (y,z)RY (y)QZ (z) ≥ γ]. Now set α = PY Z[ PY Z (y,z)RY (y)QZ (z) ≥ γ] and use (4) to get
" ≤ α+ 12
p
αK/βα(PY Z ,1Y×QZ), which is (20).
Lemma 5 of [10] is the converse statement that every (K ,") privacy amplification protocol for PY Z (Z
classical) must satisfy
" ≥ E|Y |/K(PY Z , RY×PZ) . (22)
Proposition 1. The converse bounds (9) and (22) are equivalent.
Proof. To obtain (9) from this expression, use the variational form of Eγ to write " ≥maxΛ〈Λ, PY Z〉− |Y |K 〈Λ, RY×PZ〉.
Now consider tests that yield the vertices of R(PY Z , RY×PZ), specifically Λk = 1[ P(x)Q(x) ≥ γk] such that αk =〈Λk, PY Z〉 is larger than ". Since βαk(PY Z , RY×PZ) = 〈Λk, RY×PZ〉, we have
" ≥ αk − |Y |K βαk(PY Z , RY×PZ) . (23)
The function α 7→ βα interpolates linearly between vertices, and therefore the relation holds for arbitrary α.
Setting α− " = η and optimizing over η recovers (9).
To show that (9) is equivalent, we use (22) to choose a suitable η in the optimization. Specifically, suppose
K? is the optimizer in (22) so that " = E|Y |/K?(PY Z , RY×PZ), and let γ? = |Y |/K?. Now define η = α− " for
α = PY Z[
PY Z (y,z)
RY (y)PZ (z)
≥ γ?]. Clearly η ≤ 1− " since α must be positive. On the other hand, η must be positive
since we have " = α− γ?(RY×PZ)[ PY Z (y,z)RY (y)PZ (z) ≥ γ?], the second term of which is positive. Indeed, by (3), we
must have " = " + η− γ?β"+η(PY Z , RY×PZ). Rearranging the expression gives |Y |β"+η(PY Z ,1Y×PZ) = ηK?,
and therefore K"(Y |Z)P ≤ K?. Since we have K"(Y |Z)P ≤ K? from the previous argument, this implies that
the choice of η is optimal.
The equivalence also holds when Z is quantum, because the lower boundary of the testing region is still
given by likelihood ratio tests as used above. However, the above counterexample to Lemma
We can express the converse bound using a quantity similar to the smooth min-entropy by appealing to
Proposition 13.6 of [27]. For convenience, define λ"min(Y |Z)P := 2−H"min(Y |Z)P and let λ¯"min(Y |Z)P be the same
optimization without the normalization condition. Note that dropping the normalization condition means
that we do not explicitly require QY Z as a variable at all, and we can instead simply define
λ¯"min(Y |Z)P := min{λ : λ1Y PZ ≥ PY Z − TY Z , 〈1Y Z , TY Z〉 ≤ ";λ, TY Z ≥ 0} . (24)
This holds because for any feasible λ and TY Z we can pick any QY Z ≥ 0 satisfying PY Z − TY Z ≤QY Z ≤ λ1Y PZ .
In fact, since we can replace any feasible TY Z with one satisfying PY Z − TY Z ≥ 0 without affecting feasibility
of λ, PY Z − TY Z can be assumed to be positive without loss of generality.
Proposition 2. The converse bound (22) is equivalent to
1
K"(Y |Z)P ≥ λ¯
"
min(Y |Z)P . (25)
Proof. First note that for any γ and possibly non-normalized QY Z we have
Eγ(PY Z , RY×PZ) = max
Λ
〈Λ, PY Z〉 − γ〈Λ, RY×PZ〉 (26a)
= max
Λ
〈Λ, PY Z〉 − 〈Λ,QY Z〉+ 〈Λ,QY Z〉 − γ〈Λ, RY×PZ〉 (26b)
≤ δ(PY Z ,QY Z) + Eγ(QY Z , RY×PZ) . (26c)
(This is [27, Proposition 6].) Note that here we have extended the domain of δ to include non-normalized
arguments, and now the function is no longer symmetric in its arguments. Nevertheless, its dual formulation
is still δ is δ(P,Q) = min{Tr[T] : T ≥ P − Q, T ≥ 0}. Now set QY Z = PY Z − TY Z for TY Z an optimizer in
λ¯"min(Y |Z)P . Then δ(PY Z ,QY Z) ≤ ", while the second term in (26) is zero for γ ≥ |Y |λ¯"min(Y |Z)P . Therefore,
setting γ= |Y |/K"(Y |Z)P and using (25) gives (22).
For the other direction, pick any γ > 0 and define QY Z as the pointwise minimum of PY Z and γRY×PZ . The
optimal test Λ in δ(PY Z ,QY Z) is just the indicator onto the positive part of the difference PY Z −QY Z , which by
construction is equal to the indicator onto the positive part of PY Z − γRY×PZ . Then we have δ(PY Z ,QY Z) =
Eγ(PY Z , RY×PZ). Therefore, since QY Z ≤ λ1Y PZ forλ= γ|Y | and Tr[TY Z]≤ Eγ(PY Z , RY×PZ) for TY Z the positive
part of PY Z − γRY×PZ , it follows that λ¯"min(Y |Z)P ≤ γ/|Y | for " = Eγ(PY Z , RY×PZ). Setting γ = |Y |/K"(Y |Z)P
and using (22) implies (25).
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The QY Z appearing in both directions of the above proof is smaller than PY Z , which is precisely the kind of
smoothing employed by Renner and Wolf [5]. In particular, the converse in their Theorem 1 is the statement
1
K"(Y |Z)P ≥
bλ"min(Y |Z)P , (27)
where bλ"min(Y |Z)P := min{λ : λ1Y PZ ≥ QY Z ,QY Z ≤ PY Z , 〈1Y Z ,QY Z〉 ≥ 1− ";λ,Q ≥ 0}. In light of the above,
it is perhaps not too suprising that bλ"min(Y |Z)P = λ¯"min(Y |Z)P , (28)
and thus (27) is equivalent to (25). This follows because, on the one hand, QY Z = PY Z − TY Z for TY Z optimal
in the latter is feasible in the former, and on the other, TY Z = PY Z −QY Z for QY Z optimal in the former is
feasible for the latter.
Meanwhile, the smooth min-entropy bound of Watanabe and Hayashi [7, Theorem 1] is simply
1
K"(Y |Z)P ≥ λ
"
min(Y |Z)P . (29)
(This bound can be shown using the stochastic map W as in (9), which is essentially the same as their proof.)
Nominally, then, the equivalent bounds (9), [10, Lemma 5], (25), and [5, Theorem 1] are relaxations (29).
However, these are all equivalent whenever the former are nontrivial.
Proposition 3. If λ¯"min(Y |Z)P > 1|Y | , then λ¯"min(Y |Z)P = λ"min(Y |Z)P .
Proof. Since the optimal TY Z is positive and has no entry larger than that of PY Z , the smallest normalization
of the possible QY Z is less than one. The largest is λ|Y |, and hence a normalized QY Z can be found whenever
the optimal λ is larger than 1|Y | .
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
blocklength n
ex
tr
ac
ti
on
ra
te
1 n
lo
g
K
"
(Y
n
|Zn
)
upper bound [7, (10)]
upper bound (9), [10, (154)],
[5, Th. 1], [7, Th. 1]
normal approximation [7, Th. 3]
lower bound [10, (150)]
lower bound [7, (12)]
lower bound (10), [7, (9)]
Figure 2: Comparison of finite blocklength bounds on randomness extraction from Y n relative to Zn
for the i.i.d. case of Z obtained from uniform Y through a BSC of crossover probability 0.11 and a
target security parameter of " = 10−10. The asymptotic rate for this example is 1/2.
To compare the bounds for a fixed example, consider Z obtained from uniform Y through a binary sym-
metric channel with crossover probability 0.11 and a target security parameter of " = 10−10. We follow [12,
Theorem 35] in computing βα(P×nY Z ,1Y n×RZn). Assuming QZ uniform, the lower bound of (10) and that of [7,
Equation 9] are essentially identical, with (10) improving on the latter by only four bits. The hybrid bound
of [7, Theorem 6] is considerably better. Better yet is Theorem 18 in [10]3. On the converse side, (9) and
[10, Lemma 5] allow us to sidestep the numerical difficulties associated with smoothing and still compute the
min-entropy bound [7, Theorem 1]. This yields a substantial improvement over the information-spectrum
relaxation [7, Equation 10]. The relaxation of [8, Lemma 29] is substiantially better, only two bits worse in
3Equations 150 and 153 contain a small error: The term gn(γ) inside the square root should be gn(γ)2 (Wei Yang, private communi-
cation).
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this range. (All the bounds mentioned here are formulated specifically for classical Z .) It is satisfying to see
the normal approximation obtained by disregarding the O(log n) term in [7, Theorem 3] lies midway between
the tightest upper and lower bounds. Note that in this example the O(log n) term is provably absent from the
asymptotic expansion, as shown in [10, Theorem 19].
4 Repurposing randomness extraction
4.1 Channel simulation
Given a channel W : X → Y , the task of channel simulation is to reproduce the joint input and output
statistics of W applied to X by making use of an ideal (noiseless) channel and common randomness at the
encoder and decoder. Randomness is of course necessary to simulate the stochastic nature of W , and the main
information-theoretic question is to characterize the amounts of communication and randomness required for
a given channel W and input X . A stronger variant is universal channel simulation, in which the simulation
works for any input X , i.e. the encoder is not constructed using the knowledge of the particular input X ; in
this paper we are only interested in the non-universal case.
Let us first specify the setup more concretely. Given an input distribution PX , the channel W leads to a
joint distribution PX Y . An (m, r,") protocol for simulation of W applied to X consists of an encoding map
E : (X , V )→ T and a decoding map D : (T, V )→ Y ′, such that log |T | = m, log |V | = r, and δ(PX Y , PX Y ′) ≤ ",
where Y ′ = D(E(X , V ), V ) and V is a uniformly-distributed random variable.
PX E D ≈" PX W
RV
X T Y ′
V V
X Y
Figure 3: Simulation of the channel W acting on input random variable X by means of an ideal
channel and common randomness.
The following shows that privacy amplification can be repurposed for channel simulation (see also [28]).
Proposition 4. Let W : X → Y be an arbitrary channel and PX an arbitrary input distribution. Suppose the
linear function f is a protocol for (k,") privacy amplification of Y relative to X . Then a (log |Y |−k, k,") protocol
for simulating the action of W on X can be constructed from f and PX Y .
Proof. The linear function f can always be extended to a reversible linear function g : Y → (T, V ), and given
the joint distribution PX Y , g induces a conditional distribution PT |X V . Interpreted as a channel, PT |X V defines
the encoder E. It requires log |V | bits of random input and produces a message of log |T | = log |Y |/|V | bits.
Meanwhile, the decoder D is just g−1, calling the output Y ′ instead of Y .
By design, E(V, X ) = T , meaning the combined action of D and E on PX V gives back PX Y . In the protocol,
this combined action is instead applied to PX×RV , producing PX Y ′ . By the data processing inequality we
therefore have δ(PX Y , PX Y ′) ≤ δ(PX V , PX×RV ). But the premise is that the latter quantity is bounded from
above by ", so the proof is complete.
Since we are considering linear f , it makes sense to associate the function to a linear code. Suppose we
consider f to output the syndromes of some code C encoding n− k bits into n, i.e. f (yn) = H yn, where H
is the k × n parity check matrix of C . Then, if g is to be reversible, the output in T must correspond to the
message encoded in C , and the action of g−1 is therefore to produce a codeword of C determined by t, offset
to a coset determined by v. To see this more concretely, extend H to an invertible n × n matrix M which
defines g, say M =
 
M¯
Mˆ

with Mˆ = H. The reconstruction operation will apply M−1, so that yn = M−1(t ⊕ v).
Now let M ′ = (M−1)T and set M ′ =
 
M¯ ′
Mˆ ′

for M¯ ′ an (n− k)× n matrix. In terms of M ′, the action of g−1 is
given by (yn)T = (tT ⊕ vT )M ′ = tT M¯ ′ ⊕ vT Mˆ ′. Since M M ′T = 1, HM¯ ′T = 0, meaning M¯ ′ is the generator
matrix of C , and the action of g−1 is as claimed.
For channels W whose input X induces a uniformly-random output Y , the above construction directly
leads to protocols which achieve the optimal communication rate of channel simulation in the asymptotic
i.i.d. scenario, assuming unlimited common randomness. The amount of communication required is |T n| =
|Y n|/K"(Y n|X n), and so in the i.i.d. case with uniform Y we have limn→∞ 1n log |T n|= 1n (log |Y n|−H(Y n|X n)) =
I(X :Y ) while " → 0 (cf. [29, Theorem 2]). To achieve the mutual information rate in the general case of a
non-uniform Y , one option is to concatenate the above protocol with data compression of Y n, though we will
not pursue this further here (for a similar approach applied to noisy channel communication, see [30]).
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Figure 4: Lossy compression of the random variable X . Λ is a binary-valued test that indicates 1 if
d(x , x ′)≥ d? and zero otherwise.
4.2 Lossy source coding
The task of lossy source coding is to compress a random variable X to a smaller alphabet such that the recon-
structed X ′ is close to X as measured by a distortion function d : X×X ′→ R+. There are two main approaches
to specifying the distortion constraint, by requiring either a fixed average value or a fixed probability of ex-
ceeding a specified target value. In the latter case one defines a (k, d?,") protocol for lossy compression of
X ∼ PX to consist of an encoder E : X → C and a decoder D : C → X ′ such that P[d(X , D ◦ E(X )) > d?] ≤ "
and log |C | = k. This excess distortion probability can be expressed as the expectation under PX X ′ of a test
function Λ which is 1 whenever d(x , x ′) > d? and zero otherwise, i.e. P[d(X , D ◦ E(X )) > d?] = 〈Λ, PX X ′〉.
This setup is depicted in Figure 4. In the former case, a (k, d¯) protocol consists of an encoder and decoder
such that EPX X ′ d(X , X
′) = d¯. The latter is a stronger criterion, since any "-good scheme with target value d?
can be converted into an average scheme with average distortion less than d? + "maxx ,x ′ d(x , x ′) (see, e.g.
[31, Lemma 6]).
Channel simulation is one way to construct a lossy compression protocol, as shown in [14, 15] (and later
in the quantum setting in [31–33]). For the case of excess distortion probability, we formalize the statement
as follows.
Proposition 5. Given PX , a distortion function d and a target distortion d
?, suppose that W : X → X ′ is a
channel such that the target distortion for X and X ′ is exceeded with probability no larger than "′. Then a (k,")
protocol for channel simulation of W applied to X can be used to construct a (k, d?," + "′) lossy compression
protocol for X .
Proof. Let X ′′ be the output of the channel simulation protocol, for which δ(PX X ′ , PX X ′′)≤ ". By the properties
of the variational distance, δ(PX X ′′ , PX X ′) ≥ 〈Λ, PX X ′′〉 − 〈Λ, PX X ′〉, and therefore the probability 〈Λ, PX X ′′〉 that
X and X ′′ exceed the target distortion is no larger than " + "′.
As opposed to channel simulation, in lossy compression there is no need for randomized encoding or
decoding operations. Simulation protocols adapted to lossy compression can in principle be derandomized:
Since the output distribution PX X ′′ is a mixture over the values of V and the distortion probability is linear
in PX X ′′ , one may as well pick that value of V leading to the smallest excess distortion probability. This still
leaves the randomness in the mapping PT |X=x ,V=v , but this can be derandomized in the same manner.
In the i.i.d. setting it is perhaps more natural to consider the case of average distortion directly, since
here we are interested in symbolwise distortion functions of the form d(xn, x ′n) = 1n
∑
i dsym(x i , x
′
i) for some
function dsym, as well as constructing protocols by simulating single symbol channels W : X i → X ′i (rather
than W : X n→ X ′n). In this case we have
Proposition 6. Given P×nX and a symbolwise distortion function d with 0≤ dsym(x i , x ′i)≤ 1 for all x i , x ′i , suppose
that W : X → X ′ is a channel such that EPX dsym(X , X ′) = d¯ ≤ 1. Then a (k,") simulation protocol for W×n acting
on X n can be used to construct a (k, d¯ + ") lossy compression scheme for X n.
Proof. Let X ′′n be the output of the simulation protocol. Since the protocol is "-good, δ(PX i X ′i , PX i X ′′i ) ≤ " for
all i ∈ [n]. But by the definition of the variational distance,
δ(PX i X ′i , PX i X ′′i ) = max0≤ f≤1
∑
x ,y
f (x , y)(PX i X ′′i (x , y)− PX i X ′i (x , y)) (30a)
≥∑
x ,y
dsym(x , y)(PX i X ′′i (x , y)− PX i X ′i (x , y)) (30b)
= EPXi X ′′i dsym(X i , X
′′
i )− d¯ . (30c)
Thus EPXi X ′′i dsym(X i , X
′′
i )≤ d¯ + ", and averaging over i gives the desired result.
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In the i.i.d. setting the optimal rate is given by the rate-distortion function R(d¯) = infW :d(X ,W (X ))≤d¯ I(X :
W (X )). When the optimal channel W in this expression gives a uniformly-random X ′, then we can employ an
optimal rate channel simulation protocol to construct an optimal rate lossy compression procedure. Hence,
in this case we can ultimately rely on privacy amplification of X ′ relative to X by linear functions to perform
lossy compression of X at the optimal rate. For fixed blocklength we have the following corollary:
Corollary 1. In the setting of Proposition 6, suppose PX X ′ is a joint distribution such that EPX X ′ dsym(X , X
′) ≤ d¯.
Then any linear (k,") privacy amplification protocol for X ′n relative to X n can be used to construct a (n−k, d¯+")
lossy compression scheme for X n.
The standard example of a uniformly-random source X and Hamming distortion dsym(x , x ′) = δx ,x ′ has
a uniform X ′, since the optimal channel is just a binary symmetric channel with crossover probability d¯ [34,
§10.3.1]. So, too, does the binary erasure quantization example of Martinian and Yedidia [17]. Here the
input X has alphabet {0,1, ?}, with probabilities (1− e)/2, (1− e)/2 and e for some 0 ≤ e ≤ 1, respectively,
and the symbol distortion function dsym(x , x ′) is 0 if x =? or x = x ′, and 1 otherwise. As reported by Kostina
and Verdú in [35, Equation 202], the rate distortion function for this case is R(d¯) = (1 − e)(1 − h2( d¯1−e ))
(after adapting the notation to the present setting). The optimal channel is a concatenation of the map which
randomly assigns ? inputs to 0 and 1, but leaves those input values untouched, and a binary symmetric channel
with crossover probability d¯/(1− e). It therefore has uniform output over {0,1} for any value of e.
5 Lossy compression from channel coding
By making use of duality relations for channels and codes, we can show that linear error-correcting codes
can be used to build lossy source codes. Suppose X is the random variable to be lossily compressed, and
PX X ′ is the optimal joint distribution in the rate distortion function. This induces a channel W = PX |X ′ given
the marginal PX ′ ; note that this channel is defined in the opposite sense to §4.1. Corollary 1 establishes
that lossy compression can be constructed from privacy amplification of the input of W relative to its output.
But, following [16, 36], this task is dual to channel coding (or lossless compression) for the dual channel
W⊥ : X ′→ B, where now W⊥ is a channel whose output is quantum-mechanical (see [16, §3.2] for a precise
definition). Here we restrict attention to symmetric channels W .
Specifically, Corollary 8 of [16] ensures that a (k,") code C for W⊥ (where " is the average error probability
under the optimal decoder) leads to a linear (k, 2
p
") privacy amplification protocol for X ′ relative to X . The
extractor function f is given by the generator matrix G of C acting to the right, i.e. the parity check matrix of
C⊥. In fact, using Theorem 5.1 of [36] we can improve the security parameter to
p
2" (the difference stems
from the use of the max-entropy in Corollary 8, which involves an optimization over the marginal of Z rather
than using actual marginal PZ directly). Combining this with Corollary 1, we obtain
Corollary 2. For PX |X ′ the optimal conditional distribution appearing in the rate-distortion function, let W⊥ be
the dual channel according to [16]. Then a (k,") code C for W⊥ can be used to construct an (n− k,p2") lossy
compression scheme for X n.
The reconstruction operation outputs codewords of C⊥, shifted to a coset determined by the common
randomness V . Meanwhile, the quantizer or compressor is stochastic, based on the conditional distribution
distribution PT |X V as in Proposition 4.
The dual channels for the examples mentioned above can be explicitly given. For the case of Hamming
distortion, the optimal channel from X ′ to X is also a BSC with crossover probability δ = d¯, which means the
dual channel takes the classical input z to the pure state |θz〉=pδ |0〉+ (−1)zp1−δ |1〉. For binary erasure
quantization, the optimal channel is a concatenation of a BSC with crossover probability δ = d¯/(1− e) with
an erasure channel with erasure probability e. The dual of this channel is computed in Example 3.9 of [37].
Its output consists of two independent parts, one classical and one quantum-mechanical. The classical part
is the just the output of the erasure channel with erasure probability 1− e, while the quantum part is exactly
the output of the dual of the BSC. Thus, with probability e the input to the channel shows up unchanged in
the classical part of the output, but even when the classical part is useless, the quantum part contains some
information about the input.
Note that when d¯ = 0 in the latter case, the two quantum states |θz〉 are identical, so the quantum part
of the dual output is useless. Then the dual is effectively just the erasure channel with erasure probability
1− e. The above relation between error-correcting code C for W⊥ and the use of the dual code C⊥ for privacy
amplification of W partly explains the “curious duality between erased/known symbols in source coding and
known/erased symbols in channel coding” observed by Martinian and Yedidia [17]. By more direct analysis
of error-correction and lossy compression for the erasure channel, they show an equivalence between the
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two tasks. Here we have made use of the more general theory of duality and shown one direction of the
equivalence, namely that error-correction implies lossy compression.
This also makes sense of recent results on the optimality of polar codes and spatially-coupled low-density
generator matrix codes for lossy compression, shown in [38] and [39], respectively. Polar codes are their own
duals in the sense that the dual of a polar code is given by using the frozen bits instead of the information bits,
which is again a code constructed by the properties of synthesized channels. Thus, the fact that polar codes
achieve the capacity for classical-quantum channels described above, which follows from the general result
of [40], implies that polar codes achieve the rate-distortion bound for the associated sources. One simply has
to base the scheme on the synthesized inputs with high entropy, exactly as done in [38]. Similarly, it is not
unreasonable to suspect that spatially-coupled low-density parity check (LDPC) codes achieve the capacity
of these classical-quantum channels under optimal decoding. This would imply that their duals, low-density
generator matrix (LDGM) codes, achieve the rate-distortion bound for the associated sources, precisely as
shown in [39]. Duality also helps explain that LDPC codes are themselves not useful for lossy compression,
as observed in [17], as otherwise their duals, LDGM codes, would be good for channel coding, and this is
known not to be the case [41]. Note that the implications based on duality say nothing about complexity
of encoding or decoding operations for either channel coding or lossy compression; indeed, establishing low
complexity bounds is the better part of the results of [38] and [39].
6 Discussion
We have given new bounds on the optimal rate of privacy amplification in a one-shot setting and seen that
the converse bound is equivalent to bounds based on the smooth min-entropy as well as the Eγ divergence, but
avoids the computational difficulties of smoothing in the finite-blocklength setting. While the achievability
bound is not the tightest known in the literature, the formulation of both in terms of hypothesis testing has
advantages of its own. One is the clear connection of information theory to statistics. More conceptually,
using a common quantity in optimal rate bounds allow us to see the concrete relationship of covering and
packing problems more plainly. Namely, for approximation parameter ", rate bounds for covering problems
involve β", while those for packing problems involve β1−". This supports the notion that packing is dual to
covering. An open question is whether the hypothesis-testing approach can be extended to covering problems
involving quantum information.
We have also shown that privacy amplification is a primitive for constructing channel simulation and
lossy compression protocols. Doing so enables us to extend the known duality of codes for packing (lossless
compression) and covering (privacy amplification) to the covering problem of lossy compression. Specifically,
coding duality implies that duals of good channel codes lead to good lossy source codes, at least for symmetric
channels and lossy compression setups. An immediate open question in this context is whether one can go in
the other direction, from lossy source coding back to channel coding. This was observed to be the case for the
binary erasure channel and binary erasure quantization in [17]. Perhaps the most straightforward approach
to demonstrating this would be to show that lossy source codes can be used for privacy amplification, since
duality ensures that a good privacy amplification protocol implies the existence of a good channel code for the
dual (cf [16, Corollary 8], [36, Theorem 5.2]). One could also investigate whether duality leads to improved
finite blocklength bounds on privacy amplification. However, since the dual setup involves a quantum output,
this seems doubtful as the bounds available in this case are not as tight as for classical output (see [25]).
A much bigger and more tantalizing open question is whether duality also provides a link between al-
gorithms for channel decoding and source quantization, e.g. using belief propagation (BP). Such a link was
shown in Theorem 3 of [17] for the binary erasure coding and quantization problems, and progress on the
general case could help in finding new bounds on the performance of BP. A first step in this direction would be
to extend the notion of BP decoding to the duals of classical channels. This is presumably possible by extend-
ing our construction in [42], which dealt with the dual of the BSC, since any symmetric binary-input classical
channel can be regarded as a mixture of BSCs. Though duality was not used in the construction therein, in
retrospect its role is evident. In particular, the unitaries for combining quantum information at check and
variable nodes could have been determined by appealing to the convolution rules for the BSC and Theorem 1
of [16], which states that the dual of a check convolution is the variable convolution of the duals and similarly
for the dual of a variable convolution.4 All of which hints concretely to the possibility that duality can shed
light on BP, but the details remain to be seen.
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pointing this out, twice!
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